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In his 1999 article that reviewed the state
of virtual reality (VR) Prof. Fred Brooks
Jr. noted that at that time the field had
made great technical advances over the pre-
vious 5 years. Brooks (1999) wrote “I think
our technology has crossed over the pass –
VR that used to almost work now barely
works. VR is now really real.” What is the
state today? Needless to say 15 years later,
it is the case that not only does VR “really
work” but that it has become a common-
place tool in many areas of science, technol-
ogy, psychological therapy, medical reha-
bilitation, marketing, and industry, and is
surely about to become commonplace in
the home.
Let us very briefly reprise the major
technologies reviewed by Brooks (1999).
On the display side, projection systems
such as Caves (Cruz-Neira et al., 1992) have
advanced to very high resolution, based
on multiple panel displays with automatic
and seamless image alignment (Brown
et al., 2005; Defanti et al., 2011). Head-
mounted displays (HMDs) have improved
dramatically – presenting wide field-of-
view high-resolution images, with very
recent advances toward lightweight, low
cost, and consumer oriented devices with
wide field-of-view and acceptable resolu-
tion. Beyond specialized devices there is the
promise of yet a further development with
already usable HMDs made from 3D print-
able plastic frames and cheap lenses that
house a Smartphone (Olson et al., 2011;
Hoberman et al., 2012; Steed and Julier,
2013).
Devices for virtual and augmented real-
ity displays typically require the participant
to wear specialized glasses. Autostereo dis-
plays obviate the need for this but offer
a limited continuous field-of-view (Hol-
liman et al., 2011). An important grand
challenge in the display area is the provision
of high quality full field-of-view stereo-
displays that do not require special glasses,
where there is a seamless blend between
reality and VR. Steps are being made in
this direction (Hilliges et al., 2012) and also
there is the development of such displays
based on the low cost consumer devices
(Maimone et al., 2012).
The other side of the equation to dis-
play is tracking. In recent years whole body
tracking has become a relatively low cost
product enabling real-time motion cap-
ture. But just as with HMDs, the arrival
of consumer oriented tracking systems
and depth cameras, marketed for com-
puter games, is likely to revolutionize how
real-time full body tracking and probably
head-tracking are likely to develop. Head
and body tracking over wide areas with
low latency and high accuracy remains a
significant challenge.
One thing is clear from the above – VR
is moving to the home. However, the vast
majority of the studies that assess vari-
ous aspects of the responses of people to
VR experiences typically involve very short
one-off exposure times – a notable excep-
tion being (Steed et al., 2003). Due to the
move to the consumer market this situation
obviously will and must change – although
simulator sickness may still be a significant
problem. If people in their millions will be
using these systems for hours a week, we
really need to understand the impact of
this on their lives and the resulting social
impact, as well as seeing this as an oppor-
tunity to carry out massive experimental
studies of scientific interest that also inform
the technology.
The above gives the impression that VR
is defined by devices and associated soft-
ware. However, it is more useful to consider
VR conceptually as a technological sys-
tem that can precisely substitute a person’s
sensory input and transform the meaning
of their motor outputs with reference to an
exactly knowable alternate reality (“know-
able” to distinguish from dreams or hallu-
cinogenic experiences). In this view motor
actions and sensory input are not separa-
ble. In order to perceive it is necessary to
act – to move and position the body, head,
eyes, ears, nose, and end-effectors, in active
perception. There are implicit rules that
we acquire that integrate perception and
action, referred to as sensorimotor con-
tingencies (O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Noë,
2004). The affordance of natural sensori-
motor contingencies for perception by a
VR system is a key to the generation of the
fundamental illusion that people typically
experience in an immersive VR – the illu-
sion of “presence,” “being there,” or “place
illusion (PI)” (Sanchez-Vives and Slater,
2005; Slater, 2009).
Sensorimotor contingencies refer to
acts of perception by the participant that
change his or her sensory stream. However,
there will typically also be autonomous
changes or events in the sensory stream that
are not caused by the actions of the partici-
pant. When such events, not under the con-
trol of the participant, nevertheless con-
tingently occur in response to participant
actions this can give rise to a second illu-
sion – that the perceived events are really
happening (even though they are known
for sure to be occurring in a fake real-
ity). This “plausibility illusion (Psi)” refers
therefore to the dynamic aspects of the vir-
tual environment, whereas PI can occur in
a completely static environment. Psi also
requires that if the situation being simu-
lated is one that could be encountered in
reality, then it must meet at least minimal
expectations as to how that reality func-
tions. This heralds the fact that achieving
Psi is a significantly greater challenge than

























































Slater Grand challenges in VE
PI. Whereas PI relies on deterministic fea-
tures such as the properties of the display
and tracking systems, Psi requires ecolog-
ically valid interactions between the envi-
ronment and the participant, and designs
that take into account the expectations of
people – and hence require a high level of
domain knowledge.
Sensory motor contingencies include
reaching out and touching. Moreover, if an
object or virtual human collides with the
participant, then an expected correlate of
this event would be to feel the correspond-
ing touch and force. In spite of significant
research and advances in haptic technology,
this possibility is clearly the least developed
in a general sense. Of course there are hap-
tic devices that provide feedback for highly
specific situations that were already dis-
cussed by Brooks (1999) that provide excel-
lent point contact including some level of
tactile and force feedback for highly specific
setups. Additionally there are exoskeleton
devices that can provide force feedback to
different parts of the body. At the low cost
end there are devices that can supply vibro-
tactile stimulation or air pressure through
a vest, and even a relatively low cost inge-
nious device that uses air vortex generation
to deliver haptics at a distance (Sodhi et al.,
2013). However, these do not address the
general problem of haptics.
Imagine the following scenario: while
“walking” through an environment, your
elbow happens to brush against a wall.
Later you pass by a water fountain and stop
for a drink. A few minutes later you acci-
dentally walk into a door and bump your
head. A person walking by claims to recog-
nize you and grabs your hand to vigorously
shake it. Later you step onto an up escala-
tor . . .. Comparing with the visual system,
a HMD can in principle be used to display
any type of visual stimulus; a single binau-
ral auditory setup can be used for many dif-
ferent types of auditory stimuli. However,
there is no single general-purpose haptic
device that could be used to deliver appro-
priate tactile and force feedback stimuli for
these examples. In fact, there may not be
any haptic device to reasonably represent
even one of them. For example, specialized
bulky single-purpose devices are required
today even to deliver a crude approxi-
mation of something as common place
as a human handshake (Giannopoulos
et al., 2011).
If we wait long enough will these
problems be solved through technological
advances? Of course, to some extent this
will be the case. But there are also limits
imposed by the laws of physics. In what I
believe is one of the most important the-
oretical articles ever written about VR, the
physicist Prof. David Deutsch discusses the
example of weightlessness where the laws
of physics impose that there can be no VR
simulation (Deutsch, 2011; chapter 5). A
VR can simulate many aspects of the expe-
rience of being in a spacecraft – the visual,
auditory, the haptic controls and feedback,
the visual illusion of floating, etc., which
may be sufficient to generate an illusion
of weightlessness (which, of course, might
be nothing like the true sensation). It can-
not, however, simulate actual weightless-
ness since the laws of physics do not permit
this under earth gravity.
Taking this argument further: if VR pro-
vides a universal multisensory simulation
of reality then one type of activity that it
must also be able to simulate is the recur-
sive act of going into and experiencing a
VR system. Here, the participant in a VR
picks up and dons a (virtual) HMD, ear-
phones, tracking devices, and then enters a
simulation of using a VR system. Within
that second level VR the participant can
enter a third level VR and so on. Slater
(2009) argued that this provides a method
for a more precise specification of the con-
cept of “immersion”: System VR(A) is more
“immersive” than system VR(B), if VR(A)
can be used to simulate going into and
experiencing VR(B), but not vice versa.
Hence “immersion” becomes a relational
operator that defines a partial order over
all possible abstractions of VR systems (a
version of VR within VR has actually been
studied, Slater et al., 1994). Since VR is sup-
posed to simulate reality, then this scheme
would give rise to the paradox that there
exists a VR system that is more immersive
than reality! However, there must always be
some aspect of reality that cannot be simu-
lated by such a VR system. If not, then the
experience provided by the system would
be completely indistinguishable from real-
ity and therefore would itself be “reality.”
For example,an experience in such a system
would require the participant to be amnesic
about the fact that they had ever entered
into the VR system, requiring a seamless
continuity of experience from the real to
the virtual. More simply, they have to be
completely unaware of the external devices
involved in bringing them into the VR. The
goal of VR to accurately simulate all aspects
of reality is physically infeasible.
This raises the question of the very goal
of VR. Is our quest to exactly simulate real-
ity? If this is the case we already know
that this cannot be achieved. However, if
our goal is to produce an illusion of reality,
then we are on much safer ground – since
we can bypass the problem of the lim-
its imposed by physics, and instead work
directly through the idea of tricking the
brain. It is certainly not a new idea that
VR aims not at simulating reality but pro-
ducing illusions – which goes to the very
heart of why it works at all. This was encap-
sulated in the approach of the late Prof.
Lawrence Stark (Stark, 1995) – as he once
said: “Virtual Reality works because reality
is virtual.” If we recognize that VR aims at
the production of illusions rather than at
reproducing reality then we can explicitly
set out to exploit the amazing capabilities
of the brain. Even generating feelings of
weightlessness may be tractable from this
point of view. For example, Ramachandran
and Seckel (2010) have shown how simple
arrangement of two mirrors can be used
with fibromyalgia patients to reduce their
pain, and coincidentally give them a feeling
of weightlessness.
Virtual reality profits from exploitation
of the brain to produce illusions of per-
ception and action. This is like finding
loopholes in the brain’s representations and
then making use of these to produce an illu-
sory reality. However, following Deutsch
(2011) the long term success of VR will
necessarily lie in actively stimulating the
brain to directly produce illusions of any
and every type of sensory stimulus and
every type of motor action. In other words
VR will need to become a brain inter-
face as the only way of approaching the
ideal of a system that can indeed substi-
tute perception of and active engagement
in knowable alternate realities, and even
meet the requirement that the participant
be amnesic about having entered a VR sys-
tem. This sounds far-fetched but there are
advances being made in neuroscience on
decoding the structure of visual represen-
tation, for example, Kamitani and Tong
(2005) and Horikawa et al. (2013), and
electrical brain stimulation to allow the
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blind to regain some vision in sightless peo-
ple (Merabet et al., 2005). To summarize
this outlook, eventually VR will become a
branch of applied neuroscience.
Today, however, the relationship
between neuroscience and VR is that VR
is used as an important tool in the inves-
tigation of some neuroscientific problems
(Bohil et al., 2011). In particular a great
deal of attention over many years has
gone into the use of VR in the study of
navigation – for example, Tcheang et al.,
2011), and more recently into how the
brain represents the body (Ehrsson, 2007;
Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and
Ehrsson, 2008; Slater et al., 2010). This
has also opened a very interesting new
application field for VR – since the work
on body representation shows that VR can
be used not simply for Place Illusion and
Plausibility but also to change the self (Yee
and Bailenson, 2007; Banakou et al., 2013;
Kilteni et al., 2013; Peck et al., 2013).
Finally immersive virtual environments
cover a huge field. There are many critical
issues not covered here: advanced display
and tracking hardware, architectures, sys-
tems, and devices; software systems for the
implementation of applications and soft-
ware and hardware architectures for effi-
ciently managing the multiple resources,
and devices typically required in a VR
application; shared virtual environments
with multiple participants; augmented and
mixed reality; AI both for adaptively learn-
ing about the goals of participants and for
controlling virtual human characters; and
the close and growing connections between
VR and robotics. An important issue, given
the necessity for VR to represent the body
of the participant and that of others, is the
problem of generating high fidelity virtual
human characters (and indeed animals in
general). Needless to say none of these are
“solved” problems, though very significant
advances have been made since (Brooks,
1999).
To summarize there are two major
grand challenges that will shape the field
in the coming years: (1) VR is becom-
ing a mass consumer product. This will
impact it at every level – devices must be
cheap, safe, and deliver convincing experi-
ences; software should allow people naïve
to programing to produce or modify envi-
ronments; and researchers should take the
opportunity for very large scale empirical
longitudinal studies of the impact of these
systems on the consumers. (2) If the
approach to VR is an attempt to simu-
late reality by devices that produce displays
and feedback that approach ever closer
to realistic fidelity then we will eventu-
ally come up against barriers determined
by physics. This is especially the case in
the realm of haptics where there seems to
be no possibility of a generalized device
that would be capable of delivering multi-
ple different types of vestibular, tactile, and
force feedback arbitrarily located anywhere
on the body. We should explicitly recog-
nize that our best ally is the brain itself,
exploiting its illusion generating capac-
ity; and ultimately achieve the highest
fidelity VR through direct brain inter-
faces for the creation of knowable alternate
worlds.
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